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I. INTRODUCTION
To quote or not to quote' is no longer a valid question in defama-
tion2 law because courts have lessened the burden on writers to use the
exact words of the speaker in quoted language.3 If individuals feel that
the press has misquoted them, they have three realistic options: First,
ignore the misquotation; second, contact the media and request a re-
traction;4 and third, file a lawsuit claiming defamation and seeking
monetary damages.' The first alternative is the easiest, but given the
emotional overtones of defamation, it is also the most unlikely. If the
media were more sensitive and less defensive, the second alternative
might be the best solution. For many individuals, however, a lawsuit
appears to be the only way to obtain satisfaction.'
Yet if the individual elects to file a lawsuit, the truth or falsity of
the quotation will be far down the list of factors addressed by the court
and may not be addressed at all.9 Plaintiffs in a defamation suit first
must weave their way through the maze of categories that the courts
have erected. 10 The most pressing questions include: (1) Is the plaintiff
1. Adapted from W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, Act III,
Scene 1.
2. A defamatory communication is one that tends to harm the reputation of a person and,
thus, to lower that person in the estimation of the community. Defamatory statements hold a
person up to ridicule, contempt, or scorn in a considerable part of the respectable community. The
meaning attributed to the statement is that which the recipient reasonably understands that it was
intended to express. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 559, 563 (1977); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
375-76 (5th ed. 1979).
The term "defamation" traditionally includes both libel and slander. Libel consists of defama-
tion by printed words or embodiment in physical form. Slander is defamation by spoken words or
transitory gestures. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977). Although this Recent Develop-
ment examines the publication of misquoted material and, therefore, technically concerns libel, the
terms "libel" and "defamation" will be used interchangeably to refer to such publications.
3. In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit held
that actual malice could not be inferred from a failure to use the speaker's exact words provided
that the fabricated quotations do not alter the substantive content of remarks that the speaker
actually made or are rational interpretations of the speaker's ambiguous remarks. Id. at 1539; see
also Dunn v. Gannett N.Y. Newspapers, 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the word
"cerdos," which translates as "pigs," was a fair translation of "litterer," the word actually used by
the mayor of Elizabeth, New Jersey to describe the relationship between the city's Hispanics and
the city's litter problem).
4. See R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG, J. SOLosKi, LmEL LAW AND THE PRESS 25 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS].
5. Id. at 78-94.
6. Id. at 152-59; see also R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 3-9 (1986).
7. See Eberhard, There's Got to Be a Better Way: Alternatives to the High Cost of Libel,
38 MERCER L. REv. 819, 828-29 (1987); LmEL LAW AND THE PRESS, supra note 4, at 82-88.
8. See LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS, supra note 4, at 78-82.
9. See Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71
IOWA L. REV. 226, 226-27 (1985); see also LmEL LAW AND THE PRESS, supra note 4, at 104-07.
10. See LmaBL LAW AND THE PRESS, supra note 4, at 200.
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a public official, a public figure, or a private figure; (2) Did the plaintiff
bring suit against a media defendant or a nonmedia defendant; (3) Does
the quoted language concern an issue of public or private concern; and
(4) Can the plaintiff prove actual malice by the defendant? Doctrines
such as the libel-proof plaintiff" and neutral reportage12 also must be
considered. Because the answers to these questions usually are unclear,
commentators in the field have described defamation law as contradic-
tory and confusing'" and a "hodge-podge that operates erratically at
best, and perversely at worst."' 4
This Recent Development will explore defamation law in the con-
text of quoted material. Part II chronicles the judicial decisions that
have given rise to the categorization of defamation suits, the definition
of actual malice, and the resulting procedural problems. Part III focuses
on the decision in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine5 and discusses re-
cent developments in the actual malice area and burden of proof re-
quirements at the summary judgment stage as these developments
relate to misquoted material. Part IV analyzes current problems that
plaintiffs in defamation cases encounter because courts fail to consider
11. The libel-proof plaintiff theory first appeared in Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d
638 (2d Cir. 1975), when the court held that because of the plaintiff's life as an habitual criminal,
he would be unlikely to recover anything more than nominal damages for allegedly libelous state-
ments and, therefore, affirmed the action's dismissal. Under the incremental harm branch of the
libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, if the disputed statements add little harm to that inflicted by the
undisputed statements, then the new harm is virtually nonexistent and the disputed statements
are not actionable. A split in the circuits developed when the District of Columbia Circuit ex-
pressly rejected the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine in Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563,
1568-69 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986). The Supreme Court, in
vacating the judgment, declined to review the lower court's holding on the libel-proof plaintiff
issue, thus letting stand the rejection of the doctrine in the D.C. Circuit. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.
at 242. In a subsequent denial of certiorari in a Second Circuit case, Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d
298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986), however, the Supreme Court let stand a form of
the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine. See Magnetti, "In the End, Truth Will Out" . . .Or Will It?, 52
Mo. L. REv. 299, 336-39 (1987). See generally Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1909 (1985).
12. The neutral reportage privilege first appeared in Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y,
Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977). Under this doctrine, the press may
report defamatory charges made by another without assuming liability for them. The republication
of such defamatory remarks is protected when four elements are met: (1) the charge must relate to
a pre-existing public controversy or generate its own controversy; (2) the charge must be made by
a public official, public figure, or prominent organization; (3) the charge must concern a public
official or public figure; and (4) the charge must be republished accurately and disinterestedly, i.e.,
neutral. R. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4.14[3] (1989); see also Magnetti, supra note 11, at 329-
31. See generally Note, The Developing Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69 VA. L. REv. 853 (1983).
13. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the
Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEo. L.J. 1519, 1519 (1987) (describing defamation law as "drip-
ping with contradictions and confusion").
14. Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F.
L. REv. 1, 2 (1983).
15. 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989).
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the truth or falsity element of the defamation tort and primarily focus
on constitutional protection under the first amendment.
Part V proposes alternatives that could aid an aggrieved plaintiff
without infringing on first amendment rights. These proposals include a
more sensitive media, legislation recognizing retraction statutes and de-
claratory judgment suits, and an expansion of the actual malice defini-
tion in cases concerning deliberate misquotation. This Recent
Development concludes that freedom of expression in a democratic so-
ciety may be maintained without the protection of deliberately mis-
quoted material and suggests that the protection of such misquotations
actually may hinder public debate.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
With the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan 6 in 1964, the
United States Supreme Court constitutionalized defamation law.17 The
New York Times case and its progeny developed a myriad of categories
into which a defamation action must fall before a court can determine
both liability and damages.'8 The new actual malice rule set forth in
New York Times required further delineation.19 The conflict between
the media's first amendment protection and an individual's reputa-
tional rights also resulted in numerous procedural decisions by the
Court. 0 These major decisions, however, posed as many new questions
as they answered old ones.2'
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17. At common law, defamation was essentially a strict liability tort. If the plaintiff proved
publication of defamatory words "of and concerning" the plaintiff, falsity was presumed. The de-
fendant then could raise the affirmative defenses of truth, fair comment, or privilege. For discus-
sions of common-law defamation on the eve of the New York Times opinion, see R. LABUNSKI,
LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 25-59 (1987); R. SMOLLA, supra note 12, §§ 1.02-1.04; Magnetti,
supra note 11, at 300-07.
18. See LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS, supra note 4, at 200; see also Dun & Bradstreet v. Green-
moss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (concerning the distinction between public and private mat-
ters); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (concerning a private figure); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (concerning a public figure); New York Times, 376
U.S. at 254 (concerning a public official).
19. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964).
20. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (discussing summary judg-
ment); Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (discussing the burden of proof);
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (discussing indepen-
dent appellate review); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (discussing the discovery process).
21. See generally W. HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER TIMES V. SULLIVAN
1-8, 24-47 (1989) (examining the questions answered by the New York Times ruling as well as the
questions posed by it); see also LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS, supra note 4, at 200-06.
1640 [Vol. 43:1637
MISQUOTED MATERIAL
A. The Categorization Decisions
1. Public Officials
New York Times22 was the first case in which the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review a state court judgment in a civil defamation
case. 2 In New York Times a City Commissioner of Montgomery, Ala-
bama brought a civil libel action against the newspaper and four black
clergymen alleging that an advertisement sponsored by the four indi-
viduals defamed him.24 The plaintiff's duties included supervision of
the police department, and the advertisement concerned police abuses
and official harassment of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.25 The plaintiff
received a favorable verdict and a 500,000 dollar damage award from an
Alabama circuit court jury. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.26
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Alabama court's
decision. Justice William Brennan's majority opinion announced a new
standard in libel actions: the Constitution requires a rule prohibiting
public officials from recovering damages for defamatory falsehoods con-
cerning their official conduct unless they can prove that the statement
was made with actual malice.27 The Court defined actual malice as
knowledge of a statement's falsity or reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.28
This standard arose out of the Court's recognition of an important
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues, even
if it includes criticism of government and public officials, should be
uninhibited.29 If freedom of expression is to have the breathing space
required to survive,30 the occasional erroneous statement arising from
free debate must be afforded a measure of protection. 1 The majority
22. 376 U.S. at 254.
23. Magnetti, supra note 11, at 307 n.36. As its vehicle for articulating a new libel standard,
the Court chose a case arising from the burgeoning civil rights movement in the South. For a
detailed analysis of the role of New York Times in the evolving political and moral values of its
time, see R SMOLLA, supra note 6, at 26-52.
24. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
25. Id. at 257-58. The advertisement did not mention the plaintiff specifically, but the plain-
tiff contended that it was "of and concerning" him because he was the commissioner responsible
for police department supervision. Id. at 258, 288.
26. Id. at 256.
27. Id. at 279.
28. Id. at 279-80. Although the majority adopted a balancing approach between first amend-
ment protection and reputational rights, Justices Hugh Black, William 0. Douglas, and Arthur
Goldberg asserted an absolute privilege for citizens and the press in a democratic society to criti-
cize official conduct. Id. at 293 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 298-99
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 270.
30. Id. at 271-72.
31. Applying the newly adopted constitutional standard, the Court determined that the
1990] 1641
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concluded that the application of the new actual malice standard to
public officials would provide that measure of protection.2
2. Public Figures
In 1967 the Supreme Court decided the companion cases of Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts33 and Associated Press v. Walker.3 4 The Court
purposefully heard both cases together to consider the impact of the
New York Times ruling on persons who are not public officials but are
public figures involved in issues of public interest. 5 Chief Justice Earl
Warren set forth the majority view 6 that the New York Times actual
malice standard extended to plaintiffs who are public figures.37 The
Chief Justice reasoned that public figures play influential roles in areas
of concern to society and that free debate on the involvement of public
figures in public issues is crucial.38
The Curtis and Walker cases vaguely defined the term "public fig-
ure." A more precise definition appeared seven years later in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 9 Public figures were deemed to be those persons
who have assumed influential positions in societal affairs or who have
thrust themselves into the public spotlight to influence the resolution of
plaintiff had failed to show actual malice with the convincing clarity that the standard demands.
Id. at 285-88.
32. The New York Times Court failed to define the term "public official." In Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), decided less than two years after New York Times, the Court expressly
declined to define the term, stating simply that "the 'public official' designation applies at the very
least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to
have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Id. at 85.
33. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Curtis the University of Georgia athletic director brought a libel
action against the Saturday Evening Post after the Post published an article accusing Butts of
fixing a football game. Id. at 135-36.
34. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Walker suit arose when a news dispatch reported that a former
Army officer, then a political activist with his own support group, personally had led a charge
against federal marshals sent to the University of Mississippi to carry out a desegregation decree.
Id. at 140.
35. Id. at 134.
36. Three other opinions were written in the case. Justice John Harlan's plurality opinion,
joined by Justices Tom Clark, Potter Stewart, and Abe Fortas, announced a new standard for
public figures: highly unreasonable conduct that constitutes an extreme departure from profes-
sional publishing standards would be actionable. Id. at 155. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justices
Byron White and William Brennan applied the New York Times actual malice standard. Id. at 164
(Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 172 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Justices Black and
Douglas, in order for the Court to reach a decision, joined Chief Justice Warren in applying the
New York Times standard. They reiterated, however, their adherence to the absolute privilege
doctrine that they had initially espoused in New York Times. Id. at 170-71 (Black, J., concurring
and dissenting); see also Magnetti, supra note 11, at 312-13.
37. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 164.
38. Id.
39. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a fuller discussion of Gertz, see infra notes 49-59 and accompa-
nying text.
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particular public controversies.40
Several post-Gertz decisions have further refined limited purpose
public figures who thrust themselves to the forefront of controversy.
Those public figures do not include a wealthy socialite drawn into a
sensational divorce case,41 an individual unwillingly dragged into an in-
vestigation of Soviet espionage activities, 42 or a research scientist receiv-
ing federal funds for animal research.43
3. Private Figures
The New York Times ruling continued to gain momentum with the
decision in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.44 The suit resulted from a
radio broadcast referring to a distributor of nudist magazines as a
"girlie-book peddler[]" engaged in "the smut literature racket."45 Al-
though the plaintiff was a private figure prior to the controversy, 46 Jus-
tice Brennan's plurality opinion concluded that the actual malice
standard enunciated in New York Times applied to all communication
involving subjects of public or general concern.47
Justice John Harlan's dissent is particularly interesting. He argued
that a different standard should apply to plaintiffs who are private
figures because they have not thrust themselves voluntarily into the
40. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. In discussing public figures, the Court stated:
[T]hose who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed
public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolu-
tion of the issues involved.
Id.
41. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), Mary Alice Firestone sued Time for defa-
mation arising from a report on her divorce. The Court held that she was not prominent enough to
be a public figure for all purposes, nor was her voluntary use of the court system to obtain a
divorce enough to qualify her as a limited purpose public figure. Id. at 453-55.
42. In WoIston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 159 (1979), the plaintiff sued
when a book published by the defendant listed him as a Soviet agent. In 1958 the plaintiff had
appeared several times before a grand jury investigating Soviet intelligence activities, at one point
had disobeyed a subpoena, and subsequently had pleaded guilty to criminal contempt. Id. at 161-
63. Although the media had covered these events in 1958, the Court found that the plaintiff had
not thrust himself to the forefront of public controversy voluntarily, but rather had been dragged
unwillingly into the investigation. Id. at 166.
43. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), plaintiff research scientist brought suit
against defendant Senator for defamation arising from the defendant's bestowal of his "Golden
Fleece" award for wasteful government spending. Id. at 114. The Court found that the plaintiff
had not thrust himself into the public controversy. The controversy was a consequence of the
award, and the Court adamantly asserted that "those charged with defamation cannot, by their
own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure." Id. at 135.
44. 403 U.S. 29 (1971), overruled by Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
45. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 33-36.
46. Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 44, 52.
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public spotlight and have less access to the media than do public figures
and public officials. 48
Within three years the Court overruled the Rosenbloom decision in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.49 Justice Harlan's dissent in Rosenbloom
became an essential part of the Gertz majority view. Although the
Court continued to focus on a plaintiff's status rather than the injury to
reputation, the Court did attempt to relieve the burden on private
plaintiffs by authorizing the use of a standard different from that of
New York Times.50 The Court recognized that a tension exists between
the need for an aggressive and uninhibited press and the justifiable in-
terest in remedying wrongful injury.51
The Court reaffirmed its application of the actual malice standard
to public officials and public figures, 52 but acknowledged two major dif-
ferences between public persons and private persons: Private persons
have less access to the channels of communication necessary to counter-
act false statements, and private persons have not assumed the risk of
close public scrutiny that is a necessary consequence of involvement in
public affairs.53 The Court held that states may set forth their own lia-
bility standard for media defamation of a private person, provided that
the standard is not strict liability.5 4 The Court then looked at the na-
ture and extent of the private person's involvement in the controversy
in Gertz and refused to characterize as a public figure an attorney rep-
resenting a client in litigation of public interest."5
Although the Gertz Court allowed recovery under a lower standard
than actual malice, recovery under that standard was limited to actual
damages, including impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, and
mental suffering.56 The Court specifically mandated that states may not
allow recovery of punitive and presumed damages without a showing of
actual malice. 57 Furthermore, because states must impose at least a neg-
48. Gertz, Id. at 70 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. 418 U.S. at 323. In Gertz a reputable Chicago attorney had represented the Nelson family
in a civil suit against the police officer who had killed their son. Id. at 325. The attorney then filed
a defamation action when the defendant's magazine labeled him a "Leninist" and a "Communist-
fronter" and alleged that he had arranged the frame-up of the police officer. Id. at 326-27. The
plaintiff won a jury verdict in his favor and a damage award of $50,000. The trial court entered
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendant, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 328-30.
50. See Magnetti, supra note 11, at 314-15.
51. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341-42.
52. Id. at 342.
53. Id. at 344-45.
54. Id. at 347.
55. Id. at 351-52.
56. Id. at 349-50.
57. Id. at 349.
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ligence standard 8 on private plaintiffs, the Gertz decision provides no
substantial relief to the private plaintiff. Only Justice Byron White in
his dissenting opinion recognized that plaintiffs face the same problem
in Gertz as faced in New York Times: the inability to obtain a judg-
ment that the publication is false, not because it is true, but because
the defendant had not acted negligently or recklessly. 59
4. Public Concern or Private Concern
In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders0 the Court once again
faced the distinction between a public and a private concern that was
first addressed in Rosenbloom and later overruled in Gertz. In a suit
arising from the defendant's issuance of an inaccurate credit report on
the plaintiff, the plaintiff received a favorable jury verdict and an award
of 50,000 dollars compensatory damages and 300,000 dollars punitive
damages.61 The award was inconsistent with the Gertz prohibition on
recovery of punitive damages without a showing of actual malice,6 2 but
the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict by finding the me-
dia protection in Gertz inapplicable in nonmedia cases.6 3
The United States Supreme Court upheld the verdict, but on dif-
ferent grounds. Because the credit report was only of interest to the
plaintiff and its customers and the report was furnished only to five
customers who contractually were foreclosed from disseminating it fur-
ther, the Court determined that the report concerned no public issues.6 4
This type of reporting required no special protection to ensure vigorous
debate on matters of public concern. 5 Justice Lewis Powell's plurality
opinion concluded that the Gertz prohibition on recovery of punitive
and presumed damages in the absence of proof of actual malice is inap-
plicable when defamatory statements do not involve matters of public
concern. 6 The Powell opinion does not address the distinction between
media and nonmedia cases relied on by the Vermont Supreme Court,
but five of the Justices specifically rejected that distinction. 7
58. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 12, §§ 3.09-3.11; see also Magnetti, supra note 11, at 318-19
n.96.
59. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 376 (White, J., dissenting).
60. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). For a detailed analysis of the Dun & Bradstreet opinion as it relates
to past and future defamation law, see Smolla, supra note 13, at 1535-48.
61. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751-52.
62. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
63. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 753.
64. Id. at 762.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 763.
67. See id. at 773 (White, J., concurring); id. at 781-82 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). In the subsequent case of Philadelphia Newspapers v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), the majority opinion again failed to address the distinction between
1990] 1645
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B. Actual Malice Defined
The actual malice standard has been confusing since its inception
in New York Times."' The New York Times Court defined actual mal-
ice as knowledge of a statement's falsity or reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.69 Several months later in Garrison v. Loui-
siana,70 the Court elaborated on the reckless disregard prong of the ac-
tual malice test by requiring a high degree of awareness of the
statement's falsity"' to satisfy the standard.
With the 1968 decision in St. Amant v. Thompson, 2 the Court
made its most obvious effort to delineate the actual malice standard. In
St. Amant the petitioner, a candidate for public office, read a series of
questions and a third party's answers thereto in a televised speech.
Based on references made to him in those answers, the respondent filed
a defamation action.73 In holding that the petitioner's broadcast of the
answers failed to meet the reckless disregard prong of the actual malice
test, the Court observed that recklessness is measured by whether a de-
fendant actually had serious doubts as to the truth of the publication,
not by whether a reasonably prudent person would have published or
investigated before publishing. 4
The Court conceded that tying the reckless disregard requirement
to a reasonable person or a prudent publisher standard would result in
greater incidents of recovery. Such a standard, however, would not fur-
ther first amendment protection against media self-censorship.75After
St. Amant reckless disregard can be established when a story is proven
to be fabricated, to be based on an unverified and anonymous source, or
to be inherently implausible; when obvious reasons exist to doubt the
media and nonmedia defendants. Id. at 779 n.4. Justice Brennan, however, repeated his rejection
of this distinction. Id. at 780 (Brennan, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring).
68. See Kaufman, Press Privacy and Malice: Reflections on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
5 CARUozo L. REv. 867, 873 (1984).
69. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). For an in-depth analysis of the
evolution of Justice Brennan's actual malice theory, see W. HoPKINS, supra note 21, at 96-107.
70. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
71. Id. at 74.
72. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
73. Id. at 728-29.
74. The Court stated:
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have pub-
lished, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to
permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and
demonstrates actual malice.
Id. at 731.
75. Id. at 731-32.
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accuracy of the information; or when the defendant makes inconsistent
statements.7"
C. The Procedural Decisions
1. Scope of Discovery
The first major procedural decision emanating from the New York
Times case came in 1979 when in Herbert v. Lando77 the Court deter-
mined that the actual malice rule dictated the scope of discovery per-
mitted in defamation actions. 78 St. Amant had brought the defendant's
state of mind into play in a plaintiff's attempt to show actual malice,7 9
and Herbert tested that ruling. The Herbert case arose when the plain-
tiff, a retired Army officer, filed suit against Columbia Broadcasting
Company and producer Barry Lando for allegations made on the pro-
gram 60 Minutes that the plaintiff fabricated reports of war crimes in
Vietnam. 0 When Lando refused to answer interrogatories concerning
his state of mind while preparing the program, the district court or-
dered that Lando answer the questions because his state of mind was of
major importance to the malice issue."1
On interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit reversed on grounds
that disclosure of the editorial process would have a chilling effect on
news reporting.8 2 On certiorari, the Supreme Court refused to grant an
evidentiary privilege for the editorial process. The Court explained that
the actual malice standard of New York Times and its progeny had
expanded the plaintiff's burden, resulting in a plaintiff's need to focus
on the editorial process in order to establish some degree of culpability
for false publication.8
76. See id. at 732.
77. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
78. See Kaufman, supra note 68, at 874.
79. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 727; see also supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the definition of actual malice).
80. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 155-56.
81. Id. at 157 (citing Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
82. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); see also Kauf-
man, supra note 68, at 873-75.
83. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 175-76. On remand, the district court dismissed nine statements
because the plaintiff failed to meet the actual malice standard. 596 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
The appellate court then labeled the remaining two statements as subsidiary to primary, nonac-
tionable issues and held them to be unactionable as well. 781 F.2d 298, 311-12 (2d Cir. 1986). This
approach is a modified version of the incremental harm branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine.
See supra note 11.
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2. Burden of Proof
New York Times and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts imposed the
burden of proof of falsity on public plaintiffs through the application of
the actual malice test. 4 The Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. decision allo-
cated to plaintiffs who are private figures the burden of proving either
negligence or malice by media defendants in cases dealing with speech
of public concern. 5 Gertz, however, failed to address the issue of who
bears the burden of proving truth or falsity if the negligence standard
were applicable.
The Supreme Court specifically addressed that question in Phila-
delphia Newspapers v. Hepps.86 The Court determined that when
speech concerns public matters, the common-law rule that the defend-
ant bear the burden of proving truth must succumb to a constitutional
mandate that the private plaintiff bear the burden of proving both fal-
sity and fault before recovering damages from a media defendant.8 7 The
Court left unanswered the questions of who bears the burden of proving
falsity when the suit involves a public figure and private speech, a pri-
vate figure and private speech, or any category of plaintiff or speech
with a nonmedia defendant.""
3. Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
grant of summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine
issue of material fact in the case.89 In reviewing a lower court's grant of
summary judgment in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,90 the Supreme Court
expressed concern over the lower court's statement that summary judg-
ment was the rule rather than the exception in libel cases." The Court
observed that proof of actual malice involves a defendant's state of
84. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text (discussing New York Times); supra notes
33-38 and accompanying text (discussing Curtis).
85. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text (discussing Gertz).
86. 475 U.S. 767 (1986). Hepps, the principal stockholder in a corporation that franchised
"Thrifty" stores, brought a defamation action against a newspaper and two reporters for a series of
articles linking him with organized crime and alleging use of those links to influence official con-
duct. Id. at 769. Although as a private plaintiff Hepps was required to prove negligence or malice
by the defendant, the Pennsylvania courts followed the common-law view that a defamatory state-
ment is presumptively false and the defendant bears the burden of proving truth as a defense. Id.
at 770.
87. Id. at 776.
88. For a fuller analysis of the Hepps decision and possible answers to these questions, see
Smolla, supra note 13, at 1525-31.
89. FED. R Crv. P. 56(c).
90. 443 U.S. 111 (1979); see supra note 43 (discussing Hutchinson).
91. 443 U.S. at 120 (in dictum).
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mind and is not normally suitable for summary disposition. 2
Despite the Court's remarks in Hutchinson, summary judgment re-
mained a potent weapon for the media defendantY' In Anderson v. Lib-
erty Lobby, Inc.9 4 the Court further strengthened the likelihood of the
media defendant's success at the summary judgment stage. The Court
concluded that the substantive evidentiary standards applicable to a
given case must guide the determination of whether a genuine factual
issue exists for submission to the jury.9 5 In ruling on a summary judg-
ment motion in a defamation action, the trial court must determine
whether the public plaintiff has demonstrated actual malice with clear
and convincing evidence.9 6 The majority opinion, however, presented
conflicting guidelines for the trial court's use in determining the exis-
tence of a genuine factual issue with respect to actual malice.9 7 While
the Court exhorted the trial judge to look at the quantum and quality
of the proof to determine whether it is of sufficient caliber to meet the
clear and convincing standard,98 the Court also warned that the judge's
role does not extend to weighing evidence, making credibility determi-
nations, or drawing legitimate inferences from the facts.99
4. Independent Appellate Review
The doctrine of independent appellate review is the final barrier to
recovery for defamation plaintiffs. 100 The New York Times ruling im-
poses a duty on reviewing courts to make an independent examination
of the entire record to ensure that actual malice was proven with con-
92. Id. at 120 n.9. In enunciating the new actual malice standard, the New York Times
Court stated that such actual malice must be shown with convincing clarity. New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
93. A survey conducted by the Libel Defense Resource Center revealed that 75% of the 110
summary judgment motions recorded by the Center from 1980-1982 were granted. Of the 136 sum-
mary judgment motions the Center recorded from 1982-1984, just under 75% were granted. See
Kaufman, Libel 1980-85: Promises and Realities, COMM. LAW., Fall 1985, at 21.
94. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
95. Id. at 255.
96. This ruling resolved a split in the circuits. Compare Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson,
746 F.2d 1563, 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding clear and convincing evidence irrelevant for purposes
of summary judgment), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) with Rebozo v. Washington
Post Co., 637 F.2d 375, 381 (5th Cir.) (holding clear and convincing evidence proper standard on
summary judgment ruling), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 964 (1981); Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union
of United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932, 940 (2d Cir.) (holding clear and convincing standard proper
for summary judgment ruling), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
97. Justice Brennan highlights these conflicting guides in his dissenting opinion. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 254.
99. Id. at 255.
100. Studies conducted by the Libel Defense Resource Center indicated an approximate 67%
reversal rate on libel actions decided from 1980-84. When courts employ independent review, the
reversal rate rises to about 80%. See Kaufman, supra note 93, at 21, 23.
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vincing clarity. 101 Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
however, establishes a clearly erroneous standard for review of factual
findings made by the trial judge.0 2
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.10 3 the
Supreme Court addressed the potential conflict between the two stan-
dards'0 4 and reaffirmed the independent appellate review doctrine,
characterizing it as a federal constitutional mandate in those cases gov-
erned by New York Times.105 The Court sidestepped conflict with Rule
52(a) by stating that the rule does not expressly preclude independent
review. 0 6 The Court's opinion also supports the theory that indepen-
dent appellate review in defamation cases might be outside the scope of
Rule 52(a) because the entire record is examined, not with a view to-
ward overturning factual findings, but rather for determining whether
the evidence surpasses the constitutional threshold barring an entry of
judgment without clear and convincing proof of actual malice. 0 7
Subsequent to the ruling in Bose, a conflict developed concerning
the proper deference to be given jury verdicts upon de novo review.1 8
In Tavoulareas v. Piro'09 the District of Columbia Circuit, although not
specifically addressing the scope of the Bose standard, conducted its
own examination, independent of the jury's findings, of the facts sup-
posedly establishing malice. In Connaughton v. Harte Hanks Commu-
nications"' the Sixth Circuit rejected the Tavoulareas interpretation
and held that the reviewing court, in making its own independent as-
sessment that actual malice was proven clearly and convincingly, must
assume that all facts which a jury reasonably could have found
favorable to the plaintiff were found favorable to the plaintiff."'
After granting certiorari in Harte-Hanks Communications v. Con-
naughton, the Supreme Court seemed to reach a middle ground. Rather
101. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also R. SMOLLA, supra note 12, § 12.09 (discussing the doctrine
of independent judicial review in defamation case appeals).
103. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). This defamation action arose out of a product disparagement claim
in which the respondent, in a published review of the petitioner's loudspeakers, observed that the
sound "wander[ed] about the room." Id. at 487-88.
104. See Note, The Future of Libel Law and Independent Appellate Review: Making Sense
of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 71 CORNELL L. REv. 477 (1986); Com-
ment, The Expanding Scope of Appellate Review in Libel Cases-The Supreme Court Abandons
the Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review for Findings of Actual Malice, 36 MERCER L. RE v. 711
(1985).
105. Bose, 466 U.S. at 510-11.
106. Id. at 499.
107. See id. at 510-11; see also sources cited supra note 104.
108. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 12, §§ 12.09(2)-12.09(4).
109. 817 F.2d 762, 788-98 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987).
110. 842 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
111. 842 F.2d at 843-44.
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than accepting the narrow view that judicial deference must be given to
all findings a jury reasonably could have made or the broad view that
no deference be given to jury findings, 112 the majority opinion accepted
the jury's determination of controverted facts. 113 The Court then re-
viewed the full record to determine whether the evidence supported the
jury's findings and whether actual malice could follow inextricably from
those findings."14 The Court indicated in dictum that this view was con-
sistent with its earlier decision in Bose.
115
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT: MAsSON V. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE
A. Majority Opinion
Divergent opinions ' 6 greeted the Ninth Circuit's split decision in
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,1 7 a defamation case arising from the
publication of misquoted statements. Masson exemplifies many of the
categorization, actual malice determination, and procedural problems
encountered in a defamation action.
In Masson author Janet Malcolm published a serial article in The
New Yorker magazine concerning psychoanalyst Jeffrey Masson and his
stormy association with the Sigmund Freud Archives. The article,
which was reprinted later as a book, primarily was based on the au-
thor's tape-recorded interviews with Masson. 118 Masson filed a libel ac-
tion against Malcolm, The New Yorker, and publisher Knopf,
contending that Malcolm had fabricated quotations attributed to him
and had edited his statements to his detriment." 9 The district court
granted the defendants' summary judgment motions on the grounds
that the plaintiff failed to show by clear and convincing proof any mal-
ice by the defendants in publishing the disputed passages.' 2 0
The plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Because the Ninth Cir-
cuit was reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court assumed
that defendant Malcolm deliberately altered the plaintiff's state-
112. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 12, §§ 12.09(2)-12.09(4).
113. Harte-Hanks, 109 S. Ct. at 2696-98.
114. Id. at 2697.
115. See id. at 2696 n.35.
116. For example, Harold W. Fuson, Jr., general counsel to a San Diego-based newspaper
chain and head of American Newspaper Publishers Association's legal affairs committee, stated
that "[i]ournalists don't have to be ashamed of this opinion," while Time magazine wrote that "the
victory seemed Pyrrhic." DeBenedictis, No Malice in Fabricated Quotes, A.BA J., Oct. 1989, at
32.
117. 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989).
118. Id. at 1536.
119. Id. Masson contended that the remaining two defendants knew of Malcolm's miscon-
duct before publishing the material. Id.
120. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1407 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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ments.' 2' The court then turned to the issue of whether the plaintiff, by
clear and convincing evidence, had shown actual malice by the defend-
ants. 2 2 In affirming the summary judgment ruling, the court summa-
rized the current law governing defamatory misquotations as follows:
(1) actual malice may be inferred from a fabricated quotation that is
wholly a product of the author's imagination; 123 (2) actual malice will
not be inferred when the quoted language, although not in the exact
words of the speaker, represents a rational interpretation of the
speaker's ambiguous statements; 24 and (3) actual malice will not be in-
ferred when the misquoted language does not alter the substantive con-
tent of the speaker's unambiguous statements. 125
The court analyzed in detail the eleven passages in dispute and
found five of them to be substantially true and the remaining six to be
rational interpretations of ambiguous statements made by the plaintiff,
thereby precluding any finding of actual malice.1 26 The most damaging
121. The parties disputed whether the statements were quoted accurately. For summary
judgment purposes, however, the court resolved the dispute in favor of the plaintiff, the party
opposing the motion. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537, 1547.
122. Id. at 1537-39.
123. Id. at 1539; see also Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976) (find-
ing that a jury question existed as to whether a reporter who completely fabricated quotations
attributed to Johnny Carson in conversations with NBC executives over a purported struggle to
move his show from New York to Hollywood exhibited actual malice).
124. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1538; see also Dunn v. Gannett N.Y. Newspapers, 833 F.2d 446, 452
(3d Cir. 1987) (holding that the translation of the word "litterers" into the Spanish word "cerdos,"
the English equivalent being "pigs," was a fair, albeit inadequate, translation from which malice
could not be inferred).
125. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1538; see also Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d
Cir.) (stating that actual malice will not be inferred from a change that does not increase the
defamatory impact or alter the substantive content of an original statement), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 834 (1977).
126. The court found that (1) Masson's name change because "it sounded better" when the
tape reflected he "just liked it" was substantially true, Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539-40; (2) Masson's
reference to himself as an "intellectual gigolo" was a rational interpretation of his equivalent re-
mark that he was considered to be a "private asset but a public liability," id. at 1540-41; (3) the
"moral cowardice" on the part of Freud comment was a rational interpretation of Masson's ac-
knowledged comment that Freud was "a man who just lost his courage. He was a brilliant mind
who didn't have the courage to stick with things that he knew were true," id. at 1541-42; (4) the
comment that Masson would have turned Freud's house into a "place of sex, women, fun" was
substantially true because, although the plaintiff did not use these words, they were consistent
with the plaintiff's earlier description of his lifestyle and his idea of fun, id. at 1542; (5) the plain-
tiff's reported prediction that he would be seen as "the greatest analyst who ever lived" reflected
the substance of his own self-appraisal even though the quotation did not appear in the taped
interviews, id.; (6) the comment of "don't know why I put it in" in reference to Masson's remark
blaming Freud for the sterility of psychoanalysis was a rational interpretation of an ambiguous
statement, id. at 1542-43; (7) Masson's comment "my discovery about the Schreber case" was sub-
stantially the same as remarks on tape, id. at 1543-44; (8) his comment "Eissler would have admit-
ted I was right" was a rational interpretation of ambiguous remarks, id. at 1544; (9) the comment
"Denise worries too much" was substantially the same as Masson's remarks on tape, id.; (10) the
remark "aren't too many interpretations possible" was a rational interpretation of a confusing pas-
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of the fabricated quotations was the plaintiff's reference to himself as
an "intellectual gigolo-you get your pleasure from him, but you don't
take him out in public."'127 Although the plaintiff emphatically denied
making this statement, the court reasoned that the statement was a ra-
tional interpretation of the plaintiff's earlier remarks to the effect that
he was a private asset but a public liability to others at the Freud
Archives. 2 ' To further support its determination that the fabrication
was not actionable, the court stated that because of other more provoc-
ative statements made by the plaintiff concerning himself, the "intellec-
tual gigolo" quote was not defamatory under the incremental harm
branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine. 12 9 The court concluded that
the plaintiff could not meet the requirements of the actual malice stan-
dard on any of the disputed passages and, therefore, affirmed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment.' 0
B. Dissenting Opinion
In an explosive dissent, Judge Alex Kozinski expounded his view
that first amendment principles do not extend to protection of deliber-
ate alterations of quoted material.'"' The dissent did recognize first
amendment protection for inadvertent or negligent misquotation' 2 and
cosmetic changes to improve grammar or word usage. 133 The protection
of deliberate misquotations, however, according to the dissent, was un-
necessary for the functioning of a free press. 34 If a statement is ambig-
sage, id. at 1545-46; (11) the comment "he had the wrong man," although taken out of context, was
a rational interpretation of an ambiguous statement concerning whether the plaintiff was the
wrong man to do the honorable thing or was the wrong man to keep silent for selfish reasons, id. at
1546.
127. Id. at 1540. The quotation in its entirety reads as follows:
She [the graduate student] said, "Well, it is very nice sleeping with you in your room, but
you're the kind of person who should never leave the room-you're just a social embarrass-
ment anywhere else, though you do fine in your own room." And, you know, in their way, if
not in so many words, Eissler and Anna Freud told me the same thing. They like me well
enough "in my own room." They loved to hear from me what creeps and dolts analysts are. I
was like an intellectual gigolo-you get your pleasure from him, but you don't take him out
in public."
Id. (emphasis added by the court). The italicized portion of this quote did not appear in the tape
recordings, although it did appear in the author's notes.
128. Id. at 1540-41.
129. Id. at 1541; see also supra note 11 (explaining the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine).
130. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1546, 1548.
131. Id. at 1548 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1565, 1557-58 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Harte-Hanks Communications v.
Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2696 (1989).
133. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1558-59 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Tam ASSOCIATzD PRESS
STY.EBOOK AND LmEL MANuAL 180 (1986) (instructing journalists to correct grammatical and word
usage errors in quotations).
134. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1562 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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uous, an author may select an interpretation, but must attribute that
interpretation to the speaker in the author's own words, not in the
speaker's words. 3" The dissent reasoned that in the minds of readers,
quotation marks signal the direct words of the speaker, free of interpre-
tation or editorial comment. 3 6 Readers, then, can draw their own con-
clusions rather than accepting the author's perceptions.13 7 When
authors present their defamatory interpretations as exact quotations of
speakers, speakers receive serious injuries that appear to the reader as
"self-inflicted wound[s]."' 8 The dissent concluded that the Constitu-
tion does not protect an author's use of quotation marks to conceal the
editorial role from the reader, and that libel law prohibits such
conduct. 9
The dissent disputed the applicability of the case law on which the
majority relied. 40 In conducting an examination of the discrepancies in
the quoted material, the dissent concluded that a jury could find that
nine of the eleven misquotations were defamatory.' 4 ' The dissent
charged that those nine misquotations differed from the plaintiff's ac-
tual statements in tone and content and that the majority examined
them either in isolation or out of context.142 The majority found "intel-
lectual gigolo" to be a rational interpretation of comments actually
made by the plaintiff. At the summary judgment stage, however, the
court must give the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.143 In view of the
images and emotions that gigolo is likely to evoke,144 the dissent found
that a jury certainly could conclude that the plaintiff's intellectual in-
135. Id. at 1554 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1549 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1550 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
140. The dissent found that Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976), favored
the plaintiff because both cases concerned fabrication of quotations. The dissent believed that
Dunn v. Gannett N.Y. Newspapers, 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987), was inapposite because language
translation involves judgment, especially when precise translation is impossible. This judgment is
not required, however, when quoting an English speaking person in English. Hotchner v. Castillo-
Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977), was also inapplicable because that
misquotation resulted from a translation intended to decrease the defamatory impact of insulting
words. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1554-56 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 123-25 and
accompanying text.
141. The two exceptions were "Denise worries too much" and "it sounded better." Masson,
895 F.2d at 1565 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
142. The dissent specifically addressed problems with the majority's analysis of the following
statements: "intellectual gigolo," id. at 1551-52 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); "moral cowardice," id. at
1564 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); "sex, women, fun," id. at 1553 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); "greatest
analyst," id. at 1550-51 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); and "wrong man" and "Eissler," id. at 1553
(Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also supra note 126 (listing all 11 misquotations).
143. Id. at 1551 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
144. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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tegrity was up for sale, an interpretation clearly unsupported by the
plaintiff's actual comments.'45
The dissent found strong evidence of malice on the part of the de-
fendants. The author had possession of the tapes. Because many of the
disputed passages bore a striking resemblance to the originals, a jury
could find that the author deliberately changed the statements or that
she exhibited reckless disregard by quoting from notes or memory with-
out verifying against the tapes.14 Both the magazine and the book pub-
lisher were on notice prior to publication that the plaintiff disputed
certain passages. A jury could infer reckless disregard from their failure
to listen to the tapes themselves or to request that the author document
the disputed passages because she previously had informed them that
all of her quotations were on tape.' 47 The dissent closed by observing
that the plaintiff lost his case, but the defendants and the media lost
far more. 48
IV. ANALYSIS
As a vehicle for analysis of the current status of defamation law in
the area of misquotations, a hypothetical Ms. P will be taken through
the litigation process. If a statement attributed to P by use of quotation
marks is defamatory, P in essence defames herself. If the defamatory
quotation does not contain P's exact words, however, that which ap-
pears to be a self-inflicted injury actually is imposed by another per-
son.'14 If P unsuccessfully seeks a retraction and if she chooses not to
ignore the matter, does she have a realistic chance of recovery in a libel
action against the publisher of the defamatory misquotation?
Because of the Supreme Court's constitutionalization of libel law,
the answer to that question depends more on P's personal status and
the perceived status of the misquoted statement than on the falsity of
the misquotation itself.5 ' Because four of the current Supreme Court
Justices have rejected the distinction between media and nonmedia
'cases, '5 that categorization will be eliminated for purposes of analysis.
145. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The dissent also rejected the incremental harm doctrine
relied on by the majority and noted that adoption of the doctrine conflicted with the District of
Columbia Circuit's express rejection of it. Id. at 1566 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1566-67 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1568-70 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1570 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Following this decision, the plaintiff requested a
rehearing before the Ninth Circuit, and the request was denied. 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1990). The
plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari is pending before the United States Supreme Court. 58
U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S. May 16, 1990) (No. 89-1799).
149. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1550 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
150. See Magnetti, supra note 11, at 362.
151. See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 773 (1985) (White, J., con-
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The most likely categories into which P will fall and the requirements
she must meet are as follows:
(1) Public Official or Public Figure and Speech of Public Concern
Fault level: prove actual malice
Burden of proof of falsity: on P because must prove actual malice
Damages: actual, presumed, punitive
(2) Public Official or Public Figure and Speech of Private Concern
Fault level: unclear, may be less than actual malice
Burden of proof of falsity: unclear
Damages: presumed and punitive may be recovered even if no actual malice proven
(3) Private Person and Speech of Public Concern
Fault level: state elects proof of actual malice
Burden of proof of falsity: on P because must prove actual malice
Damages: actual, presumed, punitive
(4) Private Person and Speech of Public Concern
Fault level: state elects proof of negligence
Burden of proof of falsity: on P
Damages: actual
(5) Private Person and Speech of Private Concern
Fault level: may be strict liability
Burden of proof of falsity: if statement defamatory, falsity presumed
Damages: actual, presumed, punitive' 52
P faces many barriers in the course of her litigation. Because cases
involving a private person and speech of private concern are rare, P
most likely will need to meet an actual malice or a negligence standard.
Her chances of recovery under the negligence standard are considerably
better than under the actual malice standard. 153 Under a negligence
fault standard, however, P could recover only actual damages.5 To re-
cover punitive and presumed damages in addition to actual damages, P
must meet the actual malice standard by producing clear and convinc-
ing evidence of the defendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard. 5
In producing evidence of actual malice in the publication of mis-
quoted material, technical or minor inaccuracies are insufficient. 5 6
curring); id. at 781-82 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting);
see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
152. This chart is based on an analysis of Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
(1986); Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 749; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see
also Smolla, supra note 13, at 1572-73.
153. See Smolla, supra note 13, at 1548 n.123.
154. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323.
155. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254.
156. See Sabelman, The Court's Role in Interpreting Language in Libel and Slander Cases,
45 J. Mo. BAR 399, 404-05 (1989); see also Note, A Broader Approach to the Substantial Truth
Defense, 29 B.C.L. REv. 769, 784-85 (1988).
1656 [Vol. 43:1637
MISQUOTED MATERIAL
Proof of inadvertent or negligent fabrication also will not suffice. 15 7 If
Masson is upheld, even deliberate fabrication will not meet the actual
malice standard as long as the misquotation qualifies as a rational inter-
pretation of an ambiguous remark or does not alter the substantive
meaning of an unambiguous remark. 158
Statistically, P's case never will reach the jury. About seventy-five
percent of all defamation actions are dismissed at the summary judg-
ment stage. 15 9 If P does meet her burden of proof, she possibly could
receive a jury verdict and a large monetary award in her favor. A ninety
percent likelihood exists, however, that her verdict will be overturned at
the appellate level on grounds of insufficient proof of actual malice. 60 If
the verdict survives appellate review, the damage award likely will be
reduced to between five and ten percent of the initial award.' 6 '
These figures illustrate that the truth or falsity determination nec-
essary to vindicate P's reputation becomes lost in the doctrinal morass
of categorization and procedure that protects the first amendment free-
dom of open debate in a democratic society. P's chances of recovery are
extremely limited because the emphasis of defamation law has switched
from the essential element of falsity and reputational injury to the pub-
lisher's awareness of falsity. 62 In an effort to protect press freedom, the
courts arguably have gone further than the Framers intended by pro-
tecting deliberate misquotations that are unnecessary to the functioning
of a free press.6 3
V. SUGGESTED REFORMS
In balancing the constitutional guarantee of free speech and indi-
vidual reputational interests, the scales are weighted heavily in favor of
the press.' Although Dun & Bradstreet and Hepps produced visible
cracks in the analytical foundations supporting New York Times and
its progeny, ' 5 many reform proposals have surfaced. 6 The plaintiff's
inability to meet the actual malice standard, prohibitive defense costs,
157. See supra notes 132 & 156 and accompanying text.
158. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539.
159. Kaufman, supra note 93, at 20-21.
160. Magnetti, supra note 11, at 343-44 & n.236.
161. Johnston & Kaufman, Annenberg, Sullivan at Twenty-Five, and the Question of Libel
Reform, CoMM. LAW., Winter 1989, at 8.
162. See generally Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and
Falsity, 25 WML & MARY L. RE V. 825 (1984) (tracing the shift from the defense of truth to the
plaintiff's burden to show falsity by clear and convincing proof).
163. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1561-62 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
164. Magnetti, supra note 11, at 362.
165. Smolla, supra note 13, at 1567.
166. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 6, at 238-57.
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long delays, and failure to litigate the truth or falsity issue are the prin-
cipal reasons cited in support of reform. 1'
Because individuals often feel that the press has misquoted them,
the newsroom is the most logical place to begin reform. Ninety percent
of all plaintiffs in libel suits contact the media prior to filing suit.168
Because many callers perceive reporters to be arrogant and defensive, 6 9
newspapers would benefit from a mandatory in-house training program
in human relations. 170 Disorganized newsroom policies could be coun-
tered by centering complaint-handling responsibilities in a single indi-
vidual, possibly an ombudsman"'' or a director of public relations.' 2 A
more sensitive press could diffuse many potential libel claims prior to
the formal filing of suit, particularly those relating to misquotations.
General reform suggestions in the libel area can be applied in the
misquotation arena as well. Retraction statutes and declaratory judg-
ment actions appear in several reform proposals. 1 3 The Plaintiff's Op-
tion Libel Reform Act' 74 developed by Professor Marc Franklin
authorizes a declaratory judgment action on the falsity question, thus
precluding money damages. The Act further provides that a retraction
prior to filing suit completely bars the action."' 5 Such measures could
cause both the media and the potential plaintiff to take a closer look at
the core issue-the accuracy of the quotation.
The most ambitious reform proposal currently under debate is the
Libel Reform Act developed by the Annenberg Washington Program.'
6
167. See, e.g., THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL
LAW 9-10 (1988) (available from the Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy
Studies of Northwestern University, The Willard Office Building, 1455 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.,
Suite 200, Washington, D.C. 20004).
168. See LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS, supra note 4, at 82.
169. See generally id. at 29-53 (discussing the media's role in libel disputes, including inter-
views with various newsroom personnel).
170. Id. at 53.
171. Eberhard, supra note 7, at 829-30 (examining the role of the ombudsman in the
newsroom).
172. See LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS, supra note 4, at 53.
173. See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
174. See Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L.
REv. 809, 812-13 (1986). In this article, Professor Franklin presents a detailed analysis of his pro-
posal. The proposed Act authorizes a declaratory judgment action on the falsity question, preclud-
ing money damages; places a clear and convincing burden of proof standard on the plaintiff;
awards attorney's fees to the prevailing party, provided, however, that if the plaintiff prevails, the
plaintiff must have disclosed all evidence to the defendant prior to suit to recover fees; bars pre-
trial discovery; provides that retraction prior to filing suit completely bars action; and establishes a
one-year statute of limitations. Id.
175. Id.
176. The Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies at Northwest-
ern University brought together 11 defamation experts from diverse constituencies to study libel
litigation and propose reforms. The project was directed by Rodney Smolla, the James Gould Cut-
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Stage I of the Act also imposes a powerful retraction mechanism, which
must be exercised within thirty days of publication. 177 At Stage II either
the plaintiff or the defendant may opt for a declaratory judgment ac-
tion. If the option is exercised, the Act precludes the plaintiff's pursuit
of monetary damages and provides for forfeiture of any protection that
the defendant may have had under constitutional fault requirements. 17s
The truth or falsity of the statement is the sole issue for adjudication,
the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, and the losing party pays the
winning party's attorney's fees. 179 Fee shifting creates an incentive for
self-examination of a party's claim because of the escalating costs of
maintaining a suit. 80 Stage III of the Act provides for an action similar
to the traditional defamation suit for money damages. A successful




A declaratory judgment bill8 2 similar to Stage II of the Annenberg
Proposal was introduced in Congress in 1985, but the bill was with-
drawn without formal consideration. 183 Rodney Smolla, the Director of
the Annenberg Washington Program proposal, reported that the Con-
necticut legislature introduced a bill based on the proposal and that
Congressman Charles Schumer of New York was considering introduc-
ing a bill at the federal level based on the proposal.8 One noted com-
mentator, however, vehemently opposes declaratory judgment on the
ground that libel actions are best suited to trial by jurors from the
plaintiff's community familiar with the plaintiff's reputation and the
media defendant.' That view pays homage to a mere ideal in light of
the statistics on summary judgment and appellate review reversal of
jury verdicts presented in this Recent Development.8 6 Although a de-
claratory judgment bill will face an uphill battle, reform advocates may
ler Professor of Constitutional Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, College of William & Mary. For Professor Smolla's detailed analysis of the Pro-
gram's proposed Act, see Smolla & Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal: The Case for
Enactment, 31 WM. & MARv L. REv. 25 (1989).
177. Id. at 32-33.
178. Id. at 33.
179. Id. at 33-34.
180. According to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the average cost of defending
a libel suit is $95,000. Legal fees for CBS in the Westmoreland v. CBS case were in the range of
five million to ten million dollars and in the Herbert v. Lando case were between three and four
million dollars. CBS "won" both cases. Smolla, Taking Legal Reform Seriously, 38 MERCER L. REv.
793, 803 (1987).
181. Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 176, at 34.
182. H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
183. Johnston & Kaufman, supra note 161, at 5.
184. Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 176, at 27 n.12.
185. Reuben, Reform Libel Law?, A.BA J., Apr. 1989, at 42, 43.
186. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
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draw encouragement from the language of Justice White's dissenting
opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 1" and Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's majority opinion in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps.55
The two Justices may have opened the door for declaratory judgment
actions.
A final reform proposal that relates only to suits involving mis-
quoted language would add another situation to those that the courts
already have recognized as proving actual malice. 189 Proof of deliberate
fabrication or distortion of quoted material that results in defamation
to the supposed speaker automatically would evidence a knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard sufficient to meet the actual malice stan-
dard. 90 Under this expansion, deliberate fabrication would cover more
than imaginary quotations. If authors have access to the speaker's exact
words but make their own interpretations of those words and attribute
that interpretation to the speaker by use of quotation marks, authors
are guilty of deliberate fabrication or distortion. Such a deliberate
change of the speaker's exact words evidences the author's awareness of
the falsity of the quotation or, at the very least, a reckless disregard by
failing to check the wording of the quotation against the speaker's exact
words, which are in the author's possession. The deliberateness of an
act is a factual question, and if any doubt exists, dismissal at the sum-
mary judgment stage will be inappropriate.' Because negligent, inad-
vertent, or minor misquotations do not meet this standard, a strict
liability problem is avoided. If the factfinder determines that the mis-
quotation was not deliberate or if it is not defamatory, the defendant
prevails. If the factfinder determines that the misquotation was deliber-
ate and defamatory, then the plaintiff has met the burden of proof. Re-
form proposals advocating an expansion of the actual malice test,
however, likely will collide with the Court's reluctance to delineate fur-
ther the vague language of the standard.
187. Justice White stated, "I have said before, but it bears repeating, that even if the plain-
tiff should recover no monetary damages, he should be able to prevail and have a judgment that
the publication is false." Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 393 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
188. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in dictum, stated, "Nor need we consider what standards
would apply... if a State were to provide a plaintiff with the opportunity to obtain a judgment
that declared the speech at issue to be false but did not give rise to liability for damages." Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986).
189. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (listing situations that indicate
malice).
190. This proposal is consistent with the dissent in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895
F.2d 1535, 1548 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Note, supra note 156, at 784-85.




Defamation law straddles the fence between constitutional law and
tort law.192 In attempting to balance the protection of a free press
against the protection of individual reputation, the courts most often
favor freedom of the press because of its perceived importance to open
debate in a democratic society. By raising deliberate misquotations to
the level of constitutionally protected speech, the Masson opinion is the
latest reinforcement of the courts' position in the clash between first
amendment and tort law. The principle of open debate, however, sim-
ply cannot support an extension of constitutional protection to
fabrication or distortion of quoted material by the media. Rather than
furthering freedom of expression, protecting such quotations likely
would have a chilling effect on open debate.
Elementary, high school, and college English classes teach that ma-
terial placed within quotation marks represents the actual words ut-
tered by the speaker. The ordinary person, however, realizes that
authors of fictional works put words in their characters' mouths. With
the advent of the docudrama, the ordinary viewer realizes that some
simulated dialogue takes place between the historical figures de-
picted.19 This same ordinary person, however, when reading a work of
nonfiction, expects the materials placed within quotation marks to be
the speaker's own words, free of the author's interpretations, observa-
tions, and conclusions. Protecting on first amendment grounds the au-
thor's ability to change a speaker's exact words but still place them
within quotation marks as the speaker's own words is a reverse reading
of first amendment protection. If persons choose to speak out, do they
not have the right to expect that their speech will be quoted accurately
rather than quoted in terms of someone else's rational interpretation of
their remarks? If the United States Supreme Court condones these de-
liberate fabrications, both the quality and quantity of persons willing to
speak out publicly may diminish. If quotation marks no longer signal
the speaker's words, the reader's confidence in the press may plummet
further. If Masson prevails, the media purportedly wins the misquota-
tion battle, but in reality both the media and the public lose the war.
192. See Smolla, supra note 13, at 1570.
193. The court in Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 654 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), defined a
docudrama as "a dramatization of an historical event or lives of real people," and as "a creative
interpretation of reality." Id. at 658. Docudramas employ actors, simulated dialogue, and compos-
ite characters and scenes. The court further stated that "the First Amendment protects such dra-
matizations and does not demand literal truth in every episode depicted." Id.; see also Street v.
National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed,
454 U.S. 1095 (1981); Leopold v. Levin, 45 IlM. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970).
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In closing out a ten year libel action,9 Judge Irving Kaufman of
the Second Circuit observed that the facts and law in the case had been
obfuscated by emotions. 195 Unfortunately, this description applies to
nearly all defamation litigation. Because of the powerful interests at
stake and the entrenchment of the New York Times ruling and its
progeny, the clamor for reform will not be answered quickly. As the
reform debate continues, though, courts, legislators, and reformers
should remember that the first amendment guarantees free expression
but does not create a privileged industry. 96 The protection of deliber-
ately misquoted material simply extends another privilege to the media
industry without any commensurate gain in free expression.
Sharon A. Mattingly*
194. Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977),
rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Herbert v. Lando, 596 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
195. Herbert, 781 F.2d at 312.
196. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 399.
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